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THE "FEDERALISM FIVE" AS
SUPREME COURT NOMINEES, 1971-1991
BY JOHN Q. BARRETT*
COPYRIGHT © 2006 BY JOHN Q. BARRETT. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
This article looks back at the Senate confirmation hearing
testimonies of five Supreme Court nominees. Following their
appointments to the Court, these justices-Chief Justice
Rehnquist and Associate Justices O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy and
Thomas-generally voted together in path-breaking federalism
cases. They reinvigorated constitutional law limits or decreed
new ones on national legislative power, supported the
"sovereignty" of state governments, and thus came to be known
in some circles as the Rehnquist Court's "Federalism Five."'
* Professor of Law, St. John's University School of Law, New York City, and Elizabeth S.
Lenna Fellow, Robert H. Jackson Center, Jamestown, New York
(www.roberthjackson.org). This article grows out of remarks that I delivered on March 3,
2006, at St. John's Constitutional Law conference, "Federalism Past, Federalism Future."
I am very grateful to the conference participants for their generous cooperation and
excellent contributions; to the student editors of this JOURNAL, especially Robert Epstein,
Sara Goldfarb and Lecia Griepp, for their work on the conference and this symposium
issue; to my colleague Timothy Zick for envisioning the conference and providing its
intellectual leadership; and to our Dean Mary C. Daly for personal and institutional
support. I also thank Jessica Duffy, Eleni Zanias and Richard C. Spatola for their capable
research assistance.
1 It seems that syndicated columnist and Supreme Court watcher James J.
Kilpatrick was the first to popularize "Federalism Five" as a nickname for the Rehnquist
Court justices who comprised the majority that sometimes interpreted national
government powers, vis-A-vis state government powers, quite restrictively. See James
Kilpatrick, The Court's Three Cheers for States' Rights, NEWS & OBSERVER (RALEIGH, NC),
July 1, 1999, at A19. But see Mark A. Miller, Note, The Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990
and an Unbridled Spending Power: Will They Survive on the Supreme Court's Road to
Substantive Federalism, 46 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 159, 169 & n. 72 (1998) (naming these
justices "the pro-federalism five" in a publication with an earlier cover date). See also
Allison H. Eid, Preemption & the Federalism Five, 37 RUTGERS L.J. 1, 3 (2005) (using the
moniker in an article title).
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As nominees testifying before the Senate Judiciary Committee,
however, these "federalism" justices did not announce, or for the
most part even much hint at, what came to be their
consequential judicial views of national power and state
sovereignty.
WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST (1971)
During the 1971 Senate hearings on President Nixon's
nomination of Assistant Attorney General William H. Rehnquist
to the Supreme Court, the topic of federalism was entirely
absent. The Rehnquist hearings were focused on the Nixon
administration and presidential power, the Vietnam War, the
anti-war movement and law enforcement surveillance methods. 2
Mr. Rehnquist faced questions about racial segregation in schools
and about the treatment of minority voters, including in his
home state of Arizona. 3 In response to one question, he identified
Chief Justice John Marshall as the justice he most admired,
explaining that he "made the Supreme Court what it is today
more than any other person. . . . I think it is largely the
responsibility of John Marshall and his establishment of the
doctrine of judicial review which has made our Constitution a
living document."4 However, Rehnquist was not asked about, nor
did he volunteer, any views concerning national power or "states'
2 See generally Nominations of William H. Rehnquist and Lewis F. Powell, Jr.,
Hearings Before the Committee on the Judiciary United States Senate, 92d Cong. (1971),
reprinted in 8 THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: HEARINGS AND REPORTS ON
SUCCESSFUL AND UNSUCCESSFUL NOMINATIONS OF SUPREME COURT JUSTICES BY THE
SENATE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE (1916-1972) (compiled by Roy M. Mersky & J. Myron
Jacobstein, William S. Hein & Co., Inc. 1975) [hereinafter 8 HEARINGS AND REPORTS].
3 Regarding civil rights, Senator Paul J. Fannin (R.-AZ), a strong supporter of the
Rehnquist nomination, read a testimonial from his law school classmate (and of course
later his Supreme Court colleague), Arizona State Senator Sandra Day O'Connor: "When
Bill has expressed concern about any law or ordinance in the area of civil rights, it has
been to express a concern for the preservation of individual liberties of which he is a
stanch defender in the tradition of the late Justice Black." Id. at 12, reprinted in 8
HEARINGS AND REPORTS, supra note 2.
4 Id. at 192, reprinted in 8 HEARINGS AND REPORTS, supra note 2; cf. William H.
Rehnquist, The Notion of a Living Constitution, 54 TEX. L. REV. 693, 694, 704 (1976)
(elaborating his view of the sense in which the Constitution properly may be regarded as
"living").
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rights" in the context of the Tenth Amendment, the Eleventh
Amendment or constitutional federalism. 5
JUDGE SANDRA DAY O'CONNOR (1981)
Ten years later, as the Senate considered President
Reagan's nomination of then-Arizona state court judge Sandra
Day O'Connor, the constitutional law of federalism had new
vitality. The Supreme Court's 1976 decision in National League
of Cities v. Usery6 had reinvigorated constitutional protection of
states from national regulation, at least in certain functional
areas. The O'Connor hearings thus came, not surprisingly, to
focus explicitly on federalism.
Although some Senators asked Judge O'Connor broad
questions about federalism, she generally gave answers that did
little more than mention National League of Cities. Senator
Orrin Hatch, for example, asked her what powers are reserved to
the states under the Tenth Amendment. She gave a long answer
that reviewed its past dormancy, its revival in National League of
Cities, the Court's subsequent failures to interpret the Tenth
Amendment as barring other federal regulations of states, and
the states' deep concerns about federal regulations that violate
their rights.7 She cautiously concluded that she expected
National League of Cities to be cited in future litigation and said
safely that "[t]he extent to which the Court will continue along
that path I would say is somewhat uncertain."8 When later
questioners returned to the Tenth Amendment and other state-
focused topics, Judge O'Connor-identifying herself as a
westerner, an Arizonan and a state-minded person-generally
gave the same answers: the National League of Cities
5 In his simultaneous Senate confirmation hearings, nominee Lewis F. Powell also did
not face questions about national power, state power and federalism in the senses of their
contemporary significance.
6 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
7 See Nomination of Sandra Day O'Connor, Hearings Before the Committee on the
Judiciary United States Senate, 97th Cong. 85 (1981), reprinted in THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE UNITED STATES: HEARINGS AND REPORTS ON SUCCESSFUL AND UNSUCCESSFUL
NOMINATIONS OF SUPREME COURT JUSTICES BY THE SENATE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE (1916-
1981) 197 (Supp. 1983, compiled by Roy M. Mersky & J. Myron Jacobstein, William S.
Hein & Co., Inc. 1983) [hereinafter HEARINGS AND REPORTS SUPP.].
8 Id. at 86, reprinted in HEARINGS AND REPORTS SUPP., supra note 7, at 198.
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interpretation of the Tenth Amendment was an area where,
perhaps, more would be heard from the Supreme Court.9
Judge O'Connor of course was the first woman to be nominated
to serve on the Supreme Court, and the Senators were
predisposed to confirming her historic breakthrough. They were
concerned, however, to check out her competence-sometimes in
ways that seem jarringly sexist to read today, especially knowing
the record of Justice O'Connor's twenty-five years of
distinguished service on the Court. On federalism, as on most
topics, the Senators probed the nominee's views only lightly.
ASSOCIATE JUSTICE REHNQUIST (1986)
In 1986, President Reagan nominated Justice Rehnquist to
serve as chief justice and, assuming his confirmation and
appointment, Judge Antonin Scalia of the United States Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit to succeed Rehnquist
as an associate justice.
The constitutional law of federalism was, by that date, "new"
again. Just one year earlier, the Supreme Court had, in Garcia
v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority,'0  explicitly
reversed its decision in National League of Cities and declared
itself out of the business of enforcing Tenth Amendment limits on
national government action. This decision had provoked then-
Associate Justice Rehnquist, who nine years earlier had been
part of the National League of Cities majority, to imitate then-
actor Arnold Schwarzenegger's "I'll be back" Terminator."
Yet in his 1986 confirmation hearings, Justice Rehnquist-who
of course would go on to write the Court's Lopezl 2 opinion and
other federalism-related landmarks during his chief
justiceship13 -- gave testimony suggesting that the limits of
9 See id. at 121-22 & 205-06, reprinted in HEARINGS AND REPORTS SUPP., supra note
7, at 233-34 & 317-18.
10 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
11 See id. at 580 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) ("[U]nder any... approach[,] the
judgment in these cases should be affirmed, and I do not think it incumbent on those of us
in dissent to spell out further the fine points of a principle that will, I am confident, in
time again command the support of a majority of this Court.").
12 United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
13 See, e.g., Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996); Florida Prepaid
Postsecondary Education Expense Bd. v. College Savings Bank, 527 U.S. 627 (1999);
United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000); Bd. of Trustees of the University of
[Vol. 21:2
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national legislative power were non-justiciable. In response to
one question about the proper division of powers in our federal
system, Justice Rehnquist offered these thoughts:
[S]ince the Supreme Court has so expansively construed
Congress' power under the commerce clause, that how power
is actually divided between the States and Congress is now
very much a matter for Congress to decide and no longer
that much of a constitutional question. And as to how
Congress exercises that power, certainly that is not a judicial
question in the ordinary sense. But my personal preference
has always been for the feeling that if it can be done at the
local level, do it there. If it cannot be done at the local level,
try it at the State level, and if it cannot be done at the State
level, then you go to the national level.14
JUDGE ANTONIN SCALIA (1986)
Justice Rehnquist's 1986 co-nominee Judge Scalia, responding
to a direct question regarding his "general philosophy of the role
of the judiciary relative to federalism," also gave suggestively
deferential testimony about the 20th century history of judicial
review of the constitutionality of national legislative acts:
Well, I can give you my view of what it has been up to now,
anyway, or at least in this century. The fact is, it seems to
me, that the primary defender of the constitutional
balance, the Federal Government versus the States-
maybe "versus" is not the way to put it-but the primary
institution to strike the right balance is the Congress. It is
a principle of the Constitution that there are certain
responsibilities that belong to the State and some that
belong to the Federal Government, but it is essentially the
function of the Congress-the Congress, which takes the
same oath to uphold and defend the Constitution that I do
as a judge, to have that constitutional prescription in mind
Alabama v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001); but see Nevada Dept. of Human Resources v.
Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721 (2003).
14 Nomination of Justice William Hubbs Rehnquist, Hearings Before the Committee
on the Judiciary United States Senate, 99th. Cong. 209 (1986), reprinted in 12 THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: HEARINGS AND REPORTS ON SUCCESSFUL AND
UNSUCCESSFUL NOMINATIONS OF SUPREME COURT JUSTICES BY THE SENATE JUDICIARY
COMMITTEE (1916-1986) 519 (compiled by Roy M. Mersky & J. Myron Jacobstein, William
S. Hein & Co., Inc. 1989).
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when it enacts the laws [a]nd I think the history of this
century, at least, shows that by and large those
congressional determinations will be respected by the
courts. ... I think what I am saying is that on the basis of
the [C]ourt's past decisions, at any rate, the main
protection for [the Constitution's division of work between
the national government and 50 independent states] is in
the policymaking area, is in the Congress. The [C]ourt's
struggles to prescribe what is the proper role of the
Federal Government vis-A-vis the State have essentially
been abandoned for quite a while. 15
In response to a follow up question, however, Judge Scalia
clarified that he was not describing his own judicial views or
making commitments about future cases:
I think that is right, Senator. I think what the Supreme
Court decisions on the subject show is that it is very
hard to find a distinct, justiciable line between those
matters that are appropriate for the States and those
that are appropriate for the Federal Government, that
finding that line is much easier for a legislator than for a
court, and by and large the courts have not interfered. I
expect there will be more arguments urging that they do
so in the future, and I will of course keep an open
mind.16
JUDGE ANTHONY M. KENNEDY (1987)
One year later, President Reagan nominated Judge Anthony
Kennedy of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit to serve as an associate justice. On this occasion, the
President explicitly invoked federalism values as one of Judge
Kennedy's relevant credentials:
Judge Kennedy is what many in recent weeks have
referred to as a true conservative-one who believes
that our constitutional system is one of enumerated
15 Nomination of Judge Antonin Scalia, Hearings Before the Committee on the
Judiciary United States Senate, 99th Cong. 81-82 (1986), reprinted in 13 THE SUPREME
COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: HEARINGS AND REPORTS ON SUCCESSFUL AND
UNSUCCESSFUL NOMINATIONS OF SUPREME COURT JUSTICES BY THE SENATE JUDICIARY
COMMITTEE (1916-1986) 175-76 (compiled by Roy M. Mersky & J. Myron Jacobstein,
William S. Hein & Co., Inc. 1989) [hereinafter 13 HEARINGS AND REPORTS].
16 Id. at 82, reprinted in 13 HEARINGS AND REPORTS, supra note 15, at 176.
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powers-that it is we, the people who have granted
certain rights to the Government, not the other way
around. And that unless the Constitution grants a
power to the Federal Government, or restricts a
State's exercise of that power, it remains with the
States or the people.17
In his Senate hearing testimony regarding federalism, Judge
Kennedy largely walked the path of Judge Scalia's 1986
testimony. In one exchange, Judge Kennedy referred
deferentially to the role of Congress but also mentioned a general
judicial role to protect federalism. He explained that the
Constitution contains
few automatic mechanisms for the States to protect
themselves. The Congress of the United States is
charged, in my view, with the principle duty of
preserving the independence of the States, and it can
do so in many ways; in the way that it designs its
conditional grant-in-aid bills, in the ways that it
passes its statutes.
The courts, too, have a role, and the courts have
devised some very important doctrines to protect
federalism. The idea of abstention in Younger v.
Harris[IS], the Erie[19] rule, the independent State
ground rule, [20] have all been designed by the courts
out of respect for the States.
But in my view, this is the job of every branch of the
government. 21
17 Remarks Announcing the Nomination of Anthony M. Kennedy to Be an Associate
Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States, 23 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 1321
(Nov. 11, 1987).
18 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
19 Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
20 See, e.g., Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032 (1983).
21 Nominations of Anthony M. Kennedy to be Associate Justice of the Supreme Court
of the United States, Hearings before the Committee on the Judiciary United States Senate,
100th Cong. 93 (1987), reprinted in 15 THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES:
HEARINGS AND REPORTS ON SUCCESSFUL AND UNSUCCESSFUL NOMINATIONS OF SUPREME
COURT JUSTICES BY THE SENATE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE (1916-1987) 367 (compiled by Roy
M. Mersky & Gary R. Hartman, William S. Hein & Co., Inc. 1991) [hereinafter 15
HEARINGS AND REPORTS].
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In later testimony, Judge Kennedy reemphasized Congress's
primacy in determining
the shape of federalism. It seems to me that the
independence of the States, or their non-
independence, as the case may be, is really largely
now committed to the Congress of the United States,
in the enactment of its grants-in-aid programs, and in
the determination whether or not to impose conditions
that the States must comply with in order to receive
federal monies; that kind of thing.22
When Senator Gordon Humphrey expressed at the close of his
questioning a "[h]ope" that Kennedy as a Supreme Court justice
would "not intrude on our [i.e., Congress's] turf," the Judge
pledged sincerely, but only, that he would "try to comply .... 23
JUDGE CLARENCE THOMAS (1991)
In 1991, President George H.W. Bush nominated to the
Supreme Court Judge Clarence Thomas of the United States
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit.
Judge Thomas also, in his Senate testimony, gave very general
answers regarding federalism. For example, in response to
Senator Strom Thurmond's question "about the proper
relationship between the Federal and State governments" and
whether "there has been a . . . substantial increase in Federal
authority over the last few decades," Judge Thomas gave a
historically descriptive answer that foreclosed none of his options
as a prospective justice:
Senator, I think that it is clear that our country has
grown and expanded in very important ways. Through
the commerce clause,[24] for example, there has been
growth in the national scope of our Government.
Through the 1 4 th amendment, there has been
application of our Bill of Rights, or portions, to the
State governments. Through the growth in
22 Id. at 222, reprinted in 15 HEARINGS AND REPORTS, supra note 21, at 496.
23 Id. at 234, reprinted in 15 HEARINGS AND REPORTS, supra note 21, at 508.
24 U.S. CONST., Art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
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communications and travel, of course, we are more
nationalized than we were in the past.
I think what the Court has attempted to do is to
preserve in a way as best it possibly could the
autonomy of the State governments, but at the same
time recognize the growth and expansion and the
natural growth and expansion of our National
Government.25
In response to a later question about the scope of national
power under the Interstate Commerce Clause, Judge Thomas
drew on powerful personal experiences to suggest, but he did not
commit himself to, judicial deference to national legislative acts:
[T]he [Supreme] Court has read those provisions
rather broadly. But... I don't have any objection or
basis to object or at this point any quarrel with the
way that the Court has interpreted the interstate
commerce clause....
I have heard some academic objections from time to
time. But I can remember reading the Heart of Atlanta
Motel[26] case which challenged, I believe, the
accommodations provisions in the Civil Rights Act of
1964, which is based on the interstate commerce
powers. And one of the factors that was used there
was that blacks who traveled across the country were
impeded from traveling because of the lack of
accommodations.
What that brought to mind was that when I was a kid
and we would travel occasionally-I think two or three
times during my childhood-by highways from
Savannah to New York, my grandfather would go
through this long exercise of making sure that the car
25 Nomination of Judge Clarence Thomas to be Associate Justice of the Supreme Court
of the United States, Hearings Before the Committee on the Judiciary United States
Senate, 102d Cong. 132, reprinted in 17A THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES:
HEARINGS AND REPORTS ON SUCCESSFUL AND UNSUCCESSFUL NOMINATIONS OF SUPREME
COURT JUSTICES BY THE SENATE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE (1916-1991) 1360 (compiled by
Roy M. Mersky, J. Myron Jacobstein & Bonnie L. Koneski-White, William S. Hein & Co.,
Inc. 1995) [hereinafter 17A HEARINGS AND REPORTS].
26 Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964).
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was working perfectly, that you had new tires, that we
had a trunk full of food, et cetera, because there were
no accommodations. And should you break down, you
would be met with hostilities. That was the reality. So
there was indeed some, I would consider [it]
significant, impediment on the ability of us to travel
and certainly, by extension, on the flow of commerce or
travel in our society.
I have no quarrel, Senator, with the approach that the
Court has taken and certainly have had no
opportunity to review all of the cases.27
In a later exchange, when Senator Specter asked Judge
Thomas directly whether there are justiciable constitutional
limits on national legislative power, he in effect said that he was
not sure, and that time would tell:
Senator Specter. Let me move ... to a very
complicated subject and just ask one question about it.
That is the subject of federalism, and it is this: Does
our modern Constitution, as it has been interpreted,
place any restriction on Federal power vis-A-vis the
States? Or is the political answer by Congress now the
measure of the constitutional power issue?
Judge Thomas. Senator, I don't know whether we
know what the limits are. I think we realize there is
much more involvement on the part of the National
Government in our day-to-day affairs, certainly
through the 1 4 th amendment and through the
commerce clause.
I think that that issue and similar issues come into
focus in cases such as the Garcia[28] case, and I think
that that is something that will continued to be
explored and debated in the judicial arena, as well as,
I am sure, in this body and at the State government
level.
27 Hearings Before the Committee on the Judiciary on the Nomination of Clarence
Thomas, supra note 25, at 373-74, reprinted in 17A HEARINGS AND REPORTS, at 1601-02.
28 Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
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Senator Specter. So, you think the commerce clause
might not have the full sweep of enabling the
Congress to do what it chooses in the field of
commerce and regulatory and legislative power?
Judge Thomas. I don't question the current
development of the commerce clause, Senator. As I
have noted earlier, my point is that I don't think that
any of us know precisely what the limits are now, with
the advances in communications, with the increased
role of the Federal Government, with the increased
involvement of the Federal Government in our day-to-
day lives. I think that is something that certainly was
at least to some extent a concern in the Garcia case. 29
CONCLUSION
These snippets of Senate confirmation hearing testimony
demonstrate the luxury and the fiction of hindsight. We know in
2006 how the doctrines of constitutional federalism developed
over the nineteen years of the Rehnquist Court, and it is only
that knowledge that allows us to look back on each justice's
confirmation hearing testimony in an effort to discern
disclosures, clues and/or possible concealments of what was to
come. In fact, that process of searching backward seeks,
artificially, traces of cases and contexts and colleagues and
judicial writings that none of these nominees could have
imagined concretely as he or she testified.
Our backward-looking evaluations also should be tempered by
our knowledge that any Supreme Court nominee tends to testify
before the Senate only as expansively as he or she concludes is
required to obtain confirmation. Without meaning to cast
aspersions on any particular confirmation hearing or senator, we
know that Senate questioning tends to fall short of a judicial
nominee's abilities to answer, and not to answer, and to
understand the significance of the topics being discussed. Thus
while isolated moments in some of the federalism discussions in
these confirmation hearings may call Pinocchio to contemporary
29 Hearings Before the Committee on the Judiciary on the Nomination of Clarence
Thomas, supra note 25, at 491-92, reprinted in 17A HEARINGS AND REPORTS, at 1719-20.
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minds, such hindsight judgments are unfair assessments of the
human, cautious, politically informed and strategic testimony
that each Supreme Court nominee properly gave before a Senate
that did not require more explicit answers or commitments
before giving its consent to the nomination. Federalism, each
nominee recognized when asked, is part of what we are
nationally, locally and constitutionally, and these nominees
wrestled with it in the abstract as much as they were asked and
required to do.
And then, following confirmation, each nominee moved into the
realities of Supreme Court service, including judging federalism
issues. Perhaps that is what nominee William Rehnquist, age 47
in 1971, was intuiting about the job to come when he testified-
while perhaps imagining faintly the prospect of himself becoming
at some later point a chief justice-to his admiration for Chief
Justice John Marshall and described the Constitution as "a living
document." Time and real cases will bring new and perhaps even
unexpected, interpretive developments to pass for any justice.
Justice Kennedy shared, from actual Supreme Court
experience, a piece of this at St. John's University in 2000. Here
to speak to a large public audience of law students, alumni and
others, the Justice first met privately with faculty members and
informally fielded questions. A colleague asked if there was any
issue that turned out to be other than what he had expected
before his appointment to the Court. In a moment that has
stayed with many, Justice Kennedy paused, furrowed his brow,
and then all but blurted out, "It turns out that there is a lot more
to our federalism than I had realized." 30
30 Remarks of Justice Anthony M. Kennedy at St. John's University School of Law,
Jan. 28, 2000.
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